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Abstract 
It becomes ever more evident that cognitive operations serve as fundamental mechanisms 
underlying higher order ruminative thoughts. In this sham controlled within subjects study, 
we performed anodal transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) over the left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in 32 healthy participants. We tested the causal hypothesis that the 
relationship between DLPFC activity and ruminative thinking is mediated by working 
memory operations. We used the Internal Shift Task, a paradigm in which participants have to 
update and shift between specific (non)emotional representations in working memory. 
Subsequently, during an unguided rest period approximately twenty minutes after the 
stimulation, we explored the occurrence of momentary ruminative self-referent thought. The 
results demonstrated that the influence of anodal tDCS of the left DLPFC (and not of sham 
stimulation) on momentary ruminative self-referent thinking is mediated by the enhancement 
of WM operations for angry faces. Moreover, the more individuals ruminate in everyday life 
(as measured using the Ruminative Response Style), the larger this mediation effect was. 
These findings suggest that enhancing cognitive self-regulation, by increasing the ability to 
update and shift away from negative representations in working memory, might help 
individuals to control unintentional streams of self-referent thoughts that are self-critical and 
self-evaluative, a thinking style known as rumination. 
205 words 
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1. Introduction 
We all spend time thinking about our own feelings, thoughts and behavior. Self 
reflection enables us to create and clarify the meaning of past and present experiences (Boyd 
& Fales, 1983). This issue of self-referent thinking has ever inspired many scholars. Ancient 
philosophers have pondered on the nature and fundamental conditions of human self-focus as 
part of a greater understanding of personal identity. The classical aphorism “Nosce te ipsum” 
(Know thyself), attributed to Socrates, reflects the ultimate goal of using systematic self-
questioning to increase one’s self-knowledge and, as a result, to attain wisdom. However, 
although this process facilitates coping under a variety of circumstances (Austenfeld & 
Stanton, 2004; Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), it might turn out to 
be unconstructive when self-referent thoughts become rather abstract, evaluative and self-
critical (e.g., “Why do I always react this way?”, Watkins, 2008). Moreover, self-referent 
thoughts might evolve in rumination – “a class of conscious thoughts that revolve around a 
common instrumental theme and that recur in the absence of immediate environmental 
demands requiring the thoughts” (Martin & Tesser, 1996, pp. 7). Although these repetitive 
thoughts don’t necessarily have unconstructive consequences (Watkins, 2008), depression 
vulnerable individuals have the tendency to focus their thoughts on negative information and 
personal concerns. It is therefore crucial to understand how self-evaluative ruminative 
thoughts can be regulated in order to prevent them from becoming unintentional and 
unconstructive, particularly in individuals who demonstrate a tendency to ruminate in 
everyday life. 
Here, a fundamental question is whether the occurrence of ruminative thoughts could 
be attributed to underlying cognitive phenomena, such as information processing. In studies 
investigating this question, participants are usually required to make retrospective reports on 
the content of their usual thoughts, whether or not referring to a moment when they feel 
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down, sad or depressed (e.g., Joormann, Dkane, &Gotlib, 2006; Joormann & Gotlib, 2008). 
These studies tap into stable dispositions of rumination, and have shown that these trait scores 
are associated with cognitive information processes such as working memory for negative 
information (i.e., angry faces) (De Lissnyder, Koster, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2010). During 
every day functioning, however, ruminative thoughts of healthy individuals fluctuate 
continuously from one moment to another (Moberly & Watkins, 2008). Therefore, it might be 
important to assess these thoughts as how they occur naturally. In a prior study, we looked 
into brain activation over a period of 8 minutes, and afterwards asked participants to report 
their momentary thoughts during this period. Results revealed that the more unwanted self-
referent ruminative thoughts were present during the 8 minutes rest period, the less 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, Brodmann 9/46) activation was observed (Kühn, 
Vanderhasselt, De Raedt, & Gallinat, 2012). Interestingly, the DLPFC seems not only 
involved in momentary ruminative thinking (e.g., Kühn et al., 2012; Cooney, Joormann, 
Eugène, Denis, & Gotlib, 2010), but also in the active maintenance of attentional demands 
and contextual information during cognitive tasks (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; MacDonald, 
Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000) and cognitive control for mental representations in working 
memory (Goldman-Rakic, 1994; Barch et al., 1997; Braver et al., 1997; Braver et al., 2001; 
Curtis & D'Esposito, 2003). 
Working memory (WM) refers to a limited-capacity system to simultaneously 
maintain and select information over a short period of time in the service of current cognitive 
processes (Baddeley, 1992; Smith & Jonides, 1999; Miyake et al., 2000). The representations 
maintained in WM can be emotional or not, and the selection of information depends on its 
importance in the attainment of goals. In fact, it has been hypothesized that the relation 
between DLPFC and rumination would be mediated by WM operations (Joormann, Yoon, & 
Zetsche, 2007). In other words, the cognitive capacity to adequately update negative mental 
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representations in WM, which is associated with DLPFC activation, might influence the 
occurrence of momentary self-referent thoughts, preventing these thoughts to become 
uncontrollable and unconstructive (e.g., rumination). This is in line with cognitive theories 
proposing that a reduced capacity to shift away from internal representations of negative 
information could be the functional process underlying the inability to control self-referent 
ruminative thoughts, which can result in a tendency to continuously ruminate over negative 
thoughts and feelings (e.g., Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011; Mor & 
Winquist, 2002; Watkins, 2008). Based on these models, we specifically hypothesized that 
momentary ruminative self-referent thoughts would be associated with WM processes to 
update and shift away from angry faces, an ability which is associated with the DLPFC. 
To experimentally address this hypothesis, we used Transcranial Direct Current 
Stimulation (tDCS) which is a non-invasive neuromodulatory technique. This 
neuromodulatory technique consists of the application of a weak, direct electric current 
through electrodes positioned over one’s scalp, which are able to reach the neuronal tissue and 
induce polarization-shifts on the resting membrane potential (Brunoni et al., 2011). Anodal 
stimulation generally facilitates cortical activity, whereas cathodal tDCS has opposite effects. 
In many previous studies it could already be demonstrated that tDCS of the left DLPFC 
enhances cognitive processes, both for non-emotional (e.g., Fregni et al., 2005; Leite, 
Carvalho, Fregni, & Goncalves, 2011; Mulquiney et al., 2011) as emotional processes 
(Boggio et al., 2007; Wolkenstein & Plewnia, 2013). In the current experiment, we used 
anodal left tDCS to causally modulate DLPFC neural activation in order to enhance WM 
operations, and subsequently explored the occurrence of self-referent ruminative thoughts. 
Based on the literature on cognitive deficits inrumination, we used the Internal Shift Task 
(IST, De Lissnyder, Koster, & De Raedt, 2012), an experimental paradigm to evaluate the 
ability to update and shift between specific emotional and non-emotional representations in 
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WM (Garavan, 1998; Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008). Twenty minutes after the end of the 
stimulation, we explored the occurrence of momentary ruminative self-referent thoughts 
during an unguided rest period. We asked individuals to rest without any specific task - which 
is known to result in a stream of undirected free thoughts - and self-referent ruminative 
thoughts - were assessed during this period using a short self-report questionnaire (subjects 
were not aware of the purpose of our study). In this paper, momentary self-referential 
ruminative thinking refers to a temporary cognitive thought pattern that is highly dependent 
on situational cues but that is independent of mood. Trait rumination, on the other hand, is 
defined as “behaviors and thoughts that focus one’s attention on one’s depressive symptoms 
and on the implications of those symptoms”, and is considered a habitual thinking response to 
sadness (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569). 
Our study hypothesis is based on cognitive theories which propose that a reduced 
capacity to shift away from internal representations of angry faces (e.g., negative information) 
could be the functional process underlying the inability to control self-referent ruminative 
thoughts. Therefore, we hypothesized that the effect of anodal left DLPFC stimulation (versus 
sham) on momentary ruminative self-referent thoughts would be mediated by the influence of 
tDCS on WM operations to update and shift away from negative representations. Because the 
level of momentary self-focus is related to the habitual tendency to ruminate in everyday life 
(Moberly & Watkins, 2008), we predicted that trait rumination scores would moderate the 
relationship between neuromodulation, working memory operations for negative material and 
momentary ruminative self-referent thoughts. 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
2. Methods and Material 
2.1 Participants 
 Thirty-two right handed volunteers (20F/12M) ranging from 18 to 36 years in age (M 
= 22.28, SD = 3.74) participated in this study. All participants were university students or had 
a university degree and reported no history of depression or anxiety. The study was approved 
by the institutional ethics committee of the Mackenzie Presbyterian University, Brazil and by 
the National Ethics Committee (SISNEP, Brazil). 
2.2 trancranial Direct Current Stimulation 
 Direct electrical current was applied by a saline-soaked pair of surface sponge rubber 
electrodes (35 cm²) and delivered by a battery-driven stimulator. To stimulate the left DLPFC, 
the anode electrode was positioned centered over F3 according to the 10–20 international 
system for electroencephalogram electrode placement. The cathode was placed over the 
contra lateral supra orbital area. This electrodes placement and method of DLPFC localization 
is in accordance with prior tDCS studies over the left DLPFC looking at WM processes 
(Fregni et al., 2005). A constant current of 2 mA intensity was applied for 20 minutes. We 
used a sham controlled within subjects design in which all participants are their own control. 
For sham stimulation, the position of the electrodes was exactly the same as during tDCS 
stimulation; however, the current was ramped down after 30 seconds. This procedure is 
commonly used by tDCS researchers and has been found to be an almost optimal and reliable 
sham condition (Brunoni et al., 2011). Most participants (27/32) could not distinguish tDCS 
from sham stimulation. When they received the choice to guess whether they had received  
tDCS or sham stimulation, most of them did not want to guess and these participants were 
considered as unable to distinguish between tDCS and sham stimulation. To avoid carry-over 
effects from the previous stimulation, the second session was carried out after an interval of at 
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least forty-eight hours. The experiment number assigned to the participant defined the order 
of stimulation (first tDCS or first sham) for that specific participant. 
2.3 Materials 
2.3.1 Internal Shift Task (IST). The task was programmed using E-prime 2.0 
software package and ran on a Windows XP computer with a 75 Hz, 19-inch color monitor. 
The stimuli were angry and neutral faces of males and females, based on a validation 
(Goeleven, De Raedt, Leyman, & Verschuere, 2008) of the Karolinska Directed Emotional 
Faces (Lundqvist, Flykt, Öhman, 1998). For complete information on these stimuli, we refer 
to De Lissnyder et al. (2010).  
In the IST, faces are presented at the centre of the computer screen one by one. All 
participants were asked to complete two separate task conditions (in counterbalanced order), a 
non-emotion and an emotional condition. In the ‘non-emotion condition’, participants had to 
focus on the gender dimension of the face (the faces had to be categorized as male or female). 
In the ‘emotion condition’, participants had to focus on the facial emotional expression (the 
faces had to be categorized as neutral or angry). The participant’s task was to keep a silent 
mental count of the number of faces in each category, presented within a block of trials 
(participants had to count the number of male and female faces in the non-emotion condition; 
participants had to count the number of neutral and angry faces in the emotion condition). 
When a face was presented, participants were asked to press the spacebar as fast as possible to 
indicate that they had updated the number of faces seen in one of both categories, which 
means that they had updated the internal counters of their WM. Then, the next face appeared 
on the screen after a 200ms intertrial interval. Participants had to report the number of faces of 
both categories, using the number path of the keyboard at the end of each block in a fixed 
order to encourage a consistent counting strategy (e.g., in the emotion condition they had to 
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report their counts first for the neutral and then for the angry faces, in the non-emotion 
condition the order was male-female).  
 Due to the sequence of the faces, there were shift and no shift trials in each block. A 
trial is regarded as a shift if a target trial has to be updated in WM on a different category as 
its preceding trial (i.e., in the emotion condition an angry face following a neutral face). A 
trial is regarded as a no- shift if a target trial has to be updated in WM on the same category as 
its preceding trial (i.e., in the emotion condition an angry face following an angry face).  
The practice phase consisted of 3 blocks of trials and the experimental phase of 12 
blocks of items in each condition (non-emotion and emotion condition). Within each block, a 
random number between 10 to 14 trials (or faces) was presented. An example of the stimulus 
display in one single trial is presented in Figure 1. 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
2.3.2 The Momentary Ruminative Self-focus Inventory. To measure the occurrence 
of self-referent thoughts following each session (tDCS or sham), -we used a questionnaire that 
measures momentary self-reflective rumination (Mor, Marchetti, & Koster, 2013) (Portuguese 
version translated by the authors). All questions relate to self-referent, ruminative thoughts as 
a particular self-focus on feelings, reactions and sensations without immediate environmental 
demands. The statements are not inherently negative or positive, and are considered as a state 
measure of ruminative thinking. Given the timeframe of our study, we have used an earlier 
version of this questionnaire that consisted of 8 questions (instead of 6 questions that are part 
of the current version) (see Table 1), for example “Right now, I am thinking about how happy 
or sad I feel” and “Right now, I wonder why I react the way I do”. Participants were requested 
to indicate whether they were engaging in these thoughts during the relax period (see 
procedure). They were asked to respond using a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree) in order to measure the intensity of self-referent thinking. 
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In the current study, the questionnaire had acceptable internal consistency during tDCS 
(Cronbach’s alpha=.70) and sham (Cronbach’s alpha=.79) condition.  
--- Table 1 about here --- 
2.3.3 Rumination questionnaire. In order to assess trait tendencies to ruminate, the 
Rumination Response Scale was administered (RRS, Treynor, Gonzalez & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2003, Portuguese version translated by the authors). The RRS consists of items that describe 
responses to a depressed mood, related to focussing on the self, on symptoms, and on the 
origin and consequences of the distress. This self-report questionnaire consists of 22 questions 
to which participants respond on a 4-point Likert scale how often they engage in these 
responses (i.e. 1 = almost never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often, 4 = most of the time-). In the 
current study, the questionnaire has good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=.81). 
2.3.4 Mood Ratings. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, state 
version) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) was administered to measure potential mood 
changes induced by electrical stimulation. The PANAS is a commonly used 20-item self-
report questionnaire (10 for positive affect (PA) and 10 for negative affect (NA)) developed to 
measure positive and negative affect. PA represents emotions such as enthusiasm and 
alertness, and NA represents emotions such as subjective distress and un-pleasurable 
engagement.  
2.4 Procedure 
 After completing the informed consent form, participants filled out the RRS during 
the first session of the experiment. Subsequently, electrodes were soaked in saline solution 
and placed on the participant’s scalp using the electrode montage described above. Following 
5 minutes of stimulation (tDCS or sham), participants started with the IST during the 
remaining 15 minutes of stimulation. Participants were asked to perform the task as quickly 
and accurately as possible. Approximately 20 minutes after stimulation (during which the 
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tDCS device was removed, and the PANAS was administered), participants were asked to 
relax for a well-defined period of eight minutes. No specific instruction was given, except to 
sit still, relax and wait for our sign that the eight minutes would be over. This way, a post-
stimulation situation was created with no additional environmental demands that could trigger 
specific thoughts. After these eight minutes, participants filled out the Momentary Ruminative 
Self-focus Inventory. The PANAS was administered at three time points: baseline (T0), 
immediately after stimulation (T1), and approximately 60 minutes after stimulation ( T2). The 
order of tDCS/sham (within-subjects design) was counterbalanced across participants (16 
participants received first tDCS, 16 participants received first sham). Participants were fully 
debriefed at the end of the study. This experiment was part of a larger project investigating 
also EEG resting state.  
2.5 Data analytic plan 
Statistical analysis was performed using the SPSS software package (version 16.0). 
The significance level was set at an alpha level of .05. Effect sizes are reported in the form of 
partial eta-squared (ηp2). 
 To examine possible effects of tDCS on mood states, two Stimulation (tDCS, sham) x 
Time (T0, T1, T2) repeated measures ANOVAs were performed, one for Positive Affect (PA) 
and another one for Negative Affect (NA), state versions. The dependent variables were 
positive affect (sum of the scores of all emotions related to positive mood (n=10) and all the 
negative affect items (negative affect of all emotions related to negative mood (n=10)). Where 
necessary, we applied the Greenhouse-Geisser correction to ensure the assumption of 
sphericity.  
Regarding behavioral performance on the IST, we investigated the effects of 
neuromodulation on reaction times and error rates. For each participant, median reaction 
times (RT) for each category over all trials were calculated in order to reduce any influence of 
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outliers in the within-subject data. All trials, with correct and incorrect responses, were 
included in the RT data analyses1. To investigate specific (differential) effects of tDCS on RT 
for emotional and non-emotional information, a mixed model with fixed effects for 
Stimulation (tDCS, sham),  Condition (emotion, non-emotion), Stimulus Type nested within 
Condition (angry and neutral in emotion, and male and female in non-emotion conditions), 
Shift Type (shift, non shift) and its interactions, and a random intercept for each subject was 
fitted. The dependent variable was the median RT. Given the strong a priori hypotheses 
outlined in the introduction, post-hoc tests were also run to assess the differential effect of 
tDCS in the shift condition in the emotion and non-emotion condition separately. These RT 
latencies in the IST shift condition are used in the first step of the mediation analysis (see 
later). 
To investigate whether accuracy was different between tDCS and sham stimulation, 
error rates in all the IST conditions were calculated as the difference between the correct 
number and the stated number of faces seen in the preceding block (i.e., series of faces), 
always depending on the condition (emotion or non-emotion). Error rates refer to the total 
number of errors over all blocks in that condition. We performed a repeated measures 
ANOVA with Stimulation (tDCS, sham) x Condition (emotion, non-emotion) , followed by 
paired sample t-tests for both the emotion and non-emotion condition. Error rate data are 
presented in Table 3.  
Finally, in order to test our hypothesis whether WM processes for emotionally 
negative material (as measured with the IST using angry faces) mediate the relationship 
between tDCS stimulation and momentary ruminative self-referent thinking (see Figure 2 for 
an illustration of this model), a within subjects mediation analysis was performed with the 
analytic approach described by Judd, Kenny, & McClelland (2001). Following the causal step 
                                                 
1RT analyses with only correct trials (e.g., when people make a mistake reporting the number of faces according 
the instruction (non-emotion or emotion), this trial is considered erroneous and was left out of the analysis) 
yielded similar results.  
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approach of Baron and Kenny (1986), we first assessed the total effect of tDCS on self-
referent ruminative thinking using a paired t-test. Even in the absence of a total effect, one can 
check for the presence of an indirect (i.e., mediated) effect as the latter may have more power 
to be detected (Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Pettyan , 2011). Following Judd et al. (2001), 
the indirect effect is explored using a 2-step procedure. In a first step, the effect of tDCS on 
shifting latencies during the IST conditions (the arrow from tDCS/sham to IST in Figure 2) is 
assessed using a paired t-test, while in a second step the effect of stimulation induced change 
in shifting latencies during the IST on momentary ruminative self-referent thinking (the arrow 
from IST to self-referent thinking in Figure 2) is assessed using ordinary least squares 
estimation. For this second step, it is necessary to calculate: 1) difference scores for the IST 
shifting latencies and the momentary ruminative self-referent thinking scores, subtracting the 
scores in the sham condition from the scores in the tDCS condition; and 2) sum scores for the 
IST shifting latencies in the sham and tDCS condition. After that, the momentary ruminative 
self-referent thoughts difference score is regressed on the IST shifting latency difference score 
and the (mean-centered) IST shifting latency sum score. The IST shifting latency difference 
score is used to assess mediation, while the IST shifting latency sum score is used to exclude 
“moderated mediation” (i.e. a different effect of IST shifting latencies on momentary 
ruminative self-referent thinking between tDCS and sham). If both the paired t-test in step 1 
and the effect of IST shifting latency difference score in step 2 are significant, one may 
conclude that stimulation induced shifting latencies during IST, mediate the relationship 
between tDCS stimulation and momentary ruminative self-referent thinking. To check the 
specificity of the effects (we had a specific hypothesis for angry → neutral), we performed 
analyses for all the IST shift variables (emotion and non-emotion condition).  
Finally, to assess whether the mediated effect is further moderated by trait rumination 
scores (the arrows from trait rumination in Figure 2), one can look at the effect of (mean-
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centered) trait rumination on the stimulation induced change in IST shifting latencies and its 
interaction effect with IST shifting latencies on self-referent thinking difference scores. 
--- Figure 2 about here --- 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Effects of tDCS on Mood: analysis of variance 
The two Stimulation (tDCS, sham) x Time (T0, T1,T2) repeated measures ANOVAs 
with positive and negative affect as dependent variable revealed a significant main effect of 
Time for PA, [F(2, 30)=17.86, p <.0001, ηp2=.54], and for NA, [F(2, 30) =6.82, p=.004, ηp2 
=.31]. Paired t-tests revealed that both in the sham and tDCS condition, participants reported 
less PA and NA towards the end of the experiment: T1 to T0 (ps<.02) and T2 to T1 (ps<.05). 
For both PA and NA, the main effect of Stimulation and interaction with Stimulation did not 
reach significance, Fs<1.19 & ps>.32. This suggests that changes in mood are not different 
between both stimulation conditions, and therefore are unlikely to confound with the effects 
on cognitive control. Mean (with SD) scores of PA and NA during tDCS and sham 
stimulation at three time points  - baseline (T0), immediately after stimulation (T1), and 
approximately 60 minutes after stimulation ( T2) - are reported in Table 2. 
--- Table 2 about here --- 
 
3.2. Effects of tDCS on IST shifting latencies: analysis of variance 
The mixed model approach yielded a main effect for Stimulation [F(1, 471)=7.55, 
p=.006], Condition, [F(1, 471)= 7.05, p=.008], and Shift Type, [F(1, 471)=63.92, p<.001]. A 
significant Stimulation x Condition interaction, [F(1, 471)=56.80, p<.001] was observed. 
Post-hoc tests indicated that participants were faster responding to trials depicting an angry 
(t(31)=4.04, p<.001) and a neutral (t(31)=3.49 , p=.001) face in the tDCS compared to the 
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sham stimulation condition (no differences were found for trials depicting a male and female 
face between tDCS and sham stimulation, ts<1.59, ps>.12). Moreover, a significant 
interaction between Stimulation x Shift Type [F(1, 471)=30.67, p<.001] was found, with post-
hoc tests indicating that participants were faster to respond to IST shift trials during the tDCS 
compared to the sham stimulation (t(31)=3.61 , p=.001) (no differences were observed for the 
no shift trials, t(31)=1.03, p=.31). No other main or interaction effects were significant, Fs<1. 
85, ps>.16. RTs are presented in Figure 3. 
--- Figure 3 about here --- 
3.3. Effects of tDCS on IST errors: paired t-tests 
Overall, the error rates were less than 5 % (see Table 3 for the data). A Stimulation 
(tDCS, sham) x Condition (emotion, non-emotion) repeated measures ANOVA yielded no 
significant main or interaction effect (Fs<3.34, ps>.08). Moreover, paired t-tests demonstrated 
no significant differences between error rates during sham and tDCS, both for the emotion 
(t(31)=1.13, p=.27) and the non-emotion (t(31)=1.38 , p=.18) condition. Also, we observed no 
correlations between IST reaction times and error rates during both sham and tDCS, ps>.17. 
3.4. Effects of tDCS on momentary ruminative self-referent thinking: the total 
effect 
We first assessed the total effect of tDCS on momentary ruminative self-referent 
thinking scores. The amount of self-referent thinking was only numerically smaller in the 
tDCS versus the sham condition (tDCS: M=26.4, SD=6.5 versus sham: M=27.1, SD=8.7, 
p=.64, see Table 4). Despite the absence of a total effect, it is still worth exploring a 
mediation effect. Indeed, following Rucker et al. (2011), one may have much more power to 
detect an indirect effect than a total effect, especially in small samples with small total effects. 
In other words, a mediator variable could lead to a stronger indirect effect than total effect 
from the independent to dependent variable. As hypothesized and described in the data 
16 
 
analytic plan, we therefore investigate the influence of updating negative and neutral 
representations in WM as a possible mediator in this association. 
 
3.5. Effects of tDCS on momentary ruminative self-referent thinking: the 
mediated effect by WM 
In a first step, we checked whether tDCS (compared to sham) increased the ability to 
specifically shift and update internal representations (negative to neutral, male to female, and 
vice versa) in WM, as measured by the IST. Although no significant three-way interaction 
was found in the repeated measured ANOVA (see section 3.2) (even though we observed two 
two-way interactions), we proceed with testing these particular post-hoc tests given our a 
priori hypotheses in the emotion condition. To look for the specificity of the effects, we also 
analyzed the effects of tDCS (versus sham) on updating performance for neutral (neutral → 
angry in the emotion condition) and non-emotion conditions. We observed that both shifting 
away from angry to neutral, t(31) =6.80, p<.001, and shifting away from neutral to angry, 
t(31) =5.81, p<.001, was faster in the tDCS as compared to the sham condition (see Figure 3). 
The shifts in the non-emotion condition (male → female; female → male) were not 
significantly different in the tDCS versus sham condition, ts<.33 (see Figure 3). Because of 
this non-significant association between tDCS/sham and WM for the non-emotion condition, 
further mediation analysis for these non-emotion conditions were not performed. 
In a second step, we assessed the effect of stimulation induced IST shifting latencies 
(during sham and during tDCS) on the corresponding momentary ruminative self-referent 
thinking scores. We first discuss the stimulation induced change of a shift from angry to 
neutral (angry → neutral). The decrease in IST shift latencies for angry faces during tDCS 
was significantly associated with a stimulation induced decrease in momentary ruminative 
self-referent thinking (b=0.009, β=0.363, t=2.133,p=.041). Given that shifting from angry to 
neutral is faster during tDCS as compared to sham, and given the effect of tDCS induced 
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change of IST shifting latencies on momentary ruminative self-referent thinking, we can 
conclude that the relationship between tDCS and momentary ruminative self-referent thinking 
is mediated by shifting ability from angry to neutral in working memory. More specifically, 
the better participants shifted away from angry faces (angry → neutral) during 
neuromodulation of the DLPFC, the less momentary ruminative self-referent thoughts were 
reported after the neuromodulation. Importantly, we found no evidence of moderated 
mediation (p=.836), i.e. no differential effect of IST shifting latencies on momentary 
ruminative self-referent thinking between tDCS and sham.  
Next, we discuss the shift from neutral to angry. We observed that the decrease in IST 
shifting latencies was no longer significantly associated with a decrease in momentary 
ruminative self-referent thinking (b=0.005, β=0.197, t=1.102, p=.279). We also found no 
evidence of moderated mediation (p=.785). Altogether, further analysis using this mediator 
will not be performed2.  
3.6. Mediation effect moderated by trait rumination 
Finally, we explored whether the mediation effect of shifting away from angry to 
neutral representations in WM on momentary ruminative self-referent thoughts, is moderated 
by trait rumination (see Figure 2). First, a linear regression model for the difference in IST 
shifting latencies during both stimulation conditions (subtracting the scores in the sham 
condition from the scores in the tDCS condition) on (mean-centered) trait rumination, 
revealed that the difference in shifting away from angry to neutral is larger with higher trait 
rumination (b=-14.7,β=-0.50, t=-3.142, p=.004). Second, we regressed the momentary 
ruminative self-referent thinking difference score on (1) the IST shifting latencies difference 
scores, (2) the (mean-centered) trait rumination and (3) the interaction between the 
stimulation induced IST shifting latencies difference scores and trait rumination (table 5). We 
                                                 
2
 We also analyzed the data with the non shift trials in the emotion condition (angry -> angry and neutral -> 
neutral), but these mediation analyses did not reach significance. 
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observed that the magnitude of the effect of IST shifting latencies on reducing momentary 
ruminative self-referent thinking does depend on trait rumination (p=.002): the effect of tDCS 
through IST shifting latencies on reduced momentary ruminative self-referent thinking, 
increases with higher trait rumination (see Figure 4). To illustrate this point, we classified our 
sample into low and high ruminators based on a median split in Figure 4. While in the 
majority of the high ruminators, a decrease in RT from tDCS (represented by bullet points) to 
sham (represented by triangles) is associated with a decrease in momentary ruminative self-
referent thinking (i.e. the dashed lines are mostly decreasing from the observed value under 
the sham condition to the observed value under the tDCS condition). No such association is 
observed in the low trait ruminators (i.e. the solid lines are mostly flat). From the above 
described analyses, we can thus conclude that the mediation effect is moderated by trait 
rumination, more specifically its effect is most pronounced with high levels of trait 
rumination.  
--- Table 3, 4, 5 and Figure 4 about here --- 
 
4. Discussion 
We investigated the influence of DLPFC neuromodulation on working memory (WM) 
operations and momentary ruminative self-referent thinking. Anodal tDCS of the left DLPFC 
(compared to sham) did not directly influence the occurrence of momentary ruminative self-
referent thoughts. However, we observed that the influence of anodal tDCS (and not of sham 
stimulation) on momentary ruminative self-referent thinking was mediated by the 
enhancement of WM operations for angry faces. In other words, the better participants could 
update and shift away from internal representations of angry faces (angry → neutral) during 
neuromodulation of the DLPFC, the less momentary ruminative self-referent thoughts were 
reported during an 8-minutes rest period after neuromodulation. Moreover, the strength of this 
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indirect effect was moderated by the tendency to ruminate in everyday life (as measured using 
the Ruminative Response Style). In other words, the more individuals have the habitual 
tendency to ruminate, the stronger the mediation effect (see Figure 4 for an illustration of this 
model). Interestingly, not only the indirect effect was moderated by trait rumination, but we 
also found evidence for a marginal interaction effect of stimulation (tDCS, sham) and trait 
rumination on momentary ruminative self-referent thinking (p=.10), i.e. a moderated total 
effect. One possible explanation for the absence of the total effect (i.e., the effect of tDCS on 
momentary ruminative self-referent thinking) in our study with healthy participants may 
therefore be that this total effect is a mixture of no effect in low habitual ruminators and an 
effect in high habitual ruminators. In other words, in low habitual ruminators, it may be hard 
to see any decrease in momentary ruminative self-referent thinking. Future neuromodulation 
studies regarding momentary ruminative self-referent thinking should therefore focus on high 
ruminators and/or a more clinical population with larger variability in habitual rumination 
scores.  
Our results are completely in line with the impaired disengagement hypothesis (Koster 
et al., 2011), which proposes that a reduced capacity to disengage from internal 
representations of angry faces could be the functional process underlying the prolonged 
processing of self-referential material, which can result in a tendency to continuously 
ruminate over negative thoughts and feelings. Important for the present study, mood was not 
differentially influenced by the sham and tDCS condition, which means that our effects are 
not influenced by mood changes. Moreover, tDCS (always compared to sham) did not 
influence WM operations for non-emotional material (gender), which signifies that there is no 
interplay between the DLPFC and these WM operations related to ruminative self-referent 
thoughts. Also, participants were overall very accurate during the IST (less than 5 % errors), 
and error rates were similar between sham and tDCS. 
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First, how could we relate the specific interplay between DLPFC neuromodulation, 
improved mental ability to shift away from negative representations in WM and decreased 
momentary ruminative self-referent thoughts to everyday life functioning? WM, although 
classically understood as an executive system that holds and manages external (visual and 
auditory) information (Baddeley, 2012), also regulates shifting away from internally 
generated thoughts and feelings. This includes abilities to (i) shield the flow of thoughts from 
distractive, emotional stimuli and (ii) update goals, by shifting away from failed goals in order 
to pursue new ones (e.g., Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012). These WM operations 
are part of an everyday self-regulation process to update and shift away from negative 
representations that seem, based on the present findings, to influence the level of momentary 
(state dependent) self-focused ruminative thoughts later on. Indeed, well functioning 
individuals regulate self-critical negative thoughts (e.g., internal representations in WM) 
which are not in line with existing positive self-views, in order to focus on more positive 
thoughts, and this cognitive regulation is related to enhanced activation in the DLPFC and a 
reduced momentary ruminative self-focus.  
Second, how could we interpret this interplay between DLPFC neuromodulation, WM 
for negative representations and momentary ruminative self-referent thoughts as a function of 
trait rumination? It is known that updating in the context of negative content in WM generates 
the highest cognitive conflict in well-functioning individuals who report a tendency to 
ruminate in everyday life (e.g., De Lissnyder et al., 2012; Vanderhasselt et al., 2011; 2013). 
Therefore, in high ruminators there is a larger possible range for enhancing the cognitive 
regulation of self-referent ruminative thoughts, and this enhanced mental self-regulation can 
be achieved by modulating WM operations to shift away from negative representations. 
Because trait rumination is a thought processing style with unintentional streams of 
ruminative self-referent thoughts that are rather abstract and self-evaluative (Papageorgiou & 
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Wells, 2000), the enhancement of specific WM operations might facilitate the regulation of a 
momentary self-focus to eventually prevent an excessive self-focus on negative content 
(Banich et al., 2009). Indeed, individuals that have difficulties to disengage from negative 
cognitive representations, seem to become trapped in vicious cycles of negative self-referent 
thoughts, and in turn rumination might become an habitual mode of thinking (Koster et al., 
2011).To summarize, DLPFC neuromodulation enhanced the cognitive ability to shift away 
from negative material in WM, and in turn reduced the occurrence of momentary ruminative 
self-referent thoughts, possibly by making habitual ruminators more able to regulate the 
incidence of evaluative, ruminative self-referent thoughts. 
Even though most studies consider ruminative thinking as a trait characteristic, self-
referent thoughts fluctuate continuously (especially in healthy individuals) and might provide 
valuable information to understand the development of a stable trait. In this study, a self-
reported (trait) tendency to ruminate in response to negative mood was associated with a 
momentary (state) self-focus that was not explicitly associated with an emotional content, as 
assessed by the occurrence of momentary ruminative self-referent thoughts (r=.40). There are 
many ways to assess momentary self-rumination (see Smith & Alloy, 2009). In studies that 
have investigated momentary ruminative thoughts, participants are asked randomly during 
daily life to report the content of their thoughts (Moberly & Watkins, 2008; Killingsworth & 
Gilbert, 2010), or ruminative thoughts are induced by asking participants to focus their 
attention on a specific thought (presented by a statement) for some time (e.g., Cooney et al., 
2010; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012). In the current study, we asked individuals to rest without any 
specific task, which is known to result in a stream of undirected free thoughts (James, 1890; 
Filler & Giambra, 1973; Giambra, 1989). Because we did not interfere during this rest period 
and asked our questions immediately afterwards, we were able to assess naturally occurring 
self-focused thoughts without linking them to a precise emotional content or response to 
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negative mood. During this period of idleness, we found that internally generated momentary 
ruminative self-referent thoughts were causally influenced by the cognitive capacity to 
regulate negative mental representations in WM, associated with DLPFC neural activation. In 
fact, it has already been shown that increased WM performance relates to decreased mind 
wandering during daily life (e.g., Kane et al., 2007; McVay & Kane, 2010), and even predicts 
the regulation of thought and behavior (Kane & Engle, 2003). Indeed, an enhancement of the 
executive-control system to adequately combat interfering thoughts that are generated and 
maintained automatically, is related to decreased ruminative self-referent thoughts (McVay & 
Kane, 2010). Our findings go beyond these results by showing that cognitive and neural 
phenomena can be modulated to increase the ability to regulate momentary ruminative self-
referent thoughts during a period of idleness, a process closely linked to the ruminative 
thinking style. This interplay between biological and cognitive factors is in line with a 
theoretical framework of De Raedt & Koster (2010), which states that cognitive control 
processes play a central and causal role in the relation between prefrontal neural activation 
and rumination. Moreover, the current results go beyond correlational findings by using an 
experimental method that involves neuromodulation of the DLPFC to temporarily enhance its 
activity, thus allowing causal inferences. This is an important next step for building and 
refining our understanding of the neural bases of rumination. 
Some limitations of the present study should be emphasized. We measured momentary 
ruminative self-referent thoughts after the end of the unguided rest period, using simple 
valence a-specific questions that did not require complicated meta-cognitive judgements. 
Because in this study trait rumination was associated with self-referent ruminative thinking, 
we might infer that the content of the self-referent thoughts is negative, focused on problems 
and unattainable goals (Martin & Tesser, 1996; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). However, 
we did not asses the content of these self-referent thoughts. It might also be interesting to 
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relate the content of thoughts during an unguided rest period to operations of updating 
specific emotional information in working memory. Moreover, because we were not aware of 
any existing questionnaires to measure momentary ruminative self-referent thoughts, we used 
a short (so far unpublished) inventory that has only been used in a limited number of studies 
(Momentary Ruminative Self-focus Inventory; Mor et al., 2013). It is important to underscore 
that in the current study, the questionnaire has acceptable internal consistency during both the 
tDCS (Cronbach’s alpha=.70) and the sham (Cronbach’s alpha=.79) condition. In addition, 
the fact that we obtained these clear results in line with our hypothesis is indicative of 
sufficient psychometric properties of this questionnaire. A second limitation concerns the 
absent basic effects of tDCS on shifting capacities for emotion and non-emotion material. 
Although the general omnibus ANOVA indicated that tDCS (versus sham) enhanced 
performance during the IST shift trials over all conditions (interaction between Stimulation 
and Stimulus Type), and enhanced performance in the emotion condition over all trial types 
(interaction between Stimulation and Switch Type), the crucial three-way interaction was not 
significant. This might be attributed to a lack of power to detect such interaction in our small 
sample. Nevertheless, we observed a beneficial effect of tDCS on shift trials specifically in 
the emotion condition using (hypothesis driven) post hoc tests. Prior studies have shown that 
tDCS enhances WM for non-emotional information (e.g., Fregni et al., 2005) and cognitive 
processes for emotional information (e.g., Boggio et al., 2007; Vanderhasselt et al., 2013). 
Studies on the effects of tDCS on cognitive functioning have, however, never used the IST to 
measure WM processes. Therefore, more research is needed to further investigate the precise 
effects of tDCS on WM for emotional and non emotional information, to replicate the effects 
of tDCS measured using the IST. Moreover, in order to draw specific conclusions regarding 
the causal contribution of the DLPFC in updating emotional representations in WM, potential 
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contributions of and comparisons with other brain regions (e.g., right DLPFC) should be 
tested as well.  
In conclusion, the effect of anodal left DLPFC neuromodulation on the occurrence of 
momentary ruminative self-referent thoughts was mediated by updating and shifting away 
from negative representations in WM. This interplay is most pronounced in healthy volunteers 
who report a higher tendency to ruminate in everyday life, which signifies that working 
memory processes might be fundamental processes underlying a ruminative self-focus.  
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Table 1. Questions from the Momentary Ruminative Self-focus Inventory(Mor et al., 2013) 
 
Item nr Sentence 
1. Right now, I am conscious of my inner feelings. 
2. Right now, I am reflective about my life. 
3. Right now, I am aware of my innermost thoughts. 
4. Right now, I am thinking about how happy or sad I feel. 
5. Right now, I am thinking about the physical sensations I feel in my body. 
6. Right now, I wonder why I react the way I do. 
7. Right now, I am thinking about how tired or alert I feel. 
8. Right now, I am thinking about the possible meaning of the way I feel. 
 
Table 2. Mean (with SD) scores of positive and negative mood during tDCS and sham 
stimulation at three time points: baseline (T0), immediately after stimulation (T1), and 
approximately 60 minutes after stimulation ( T2). 
 
 tDCS   sham   
 
T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 
Positive Affect 29.78 (6.46) 28.40 (7.07) 25.19 (7.52) 30.84 (4.17) 27.81 (4.80) 25.05 (6.73) 
Negative Affect 14.56 (4.68) 13.28 (3.68) 12.69 (3.79) 14.00 (3.88) 13.25 (3.06) 12.86 (3.24) 
 
 
Table 3. Mean (with SD) of the total error rates for all IST conditions during tDCS and sham 
stimulation.  
 
 tDCS Sham 
 
Error Rates 
Emotion 2.03 (2.19) 2.65 (3.32) 
non-emotion 2.91 (300) 3.78 (4.28) 
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Table 4. we present an overview of all the variables and statistical findings of our 
mediation/moderation model. The first two columns present (1) median RT latencies for the 
IST trials angry -> neutral; (2) the sum score of the Momentary Ruminative Self-focus 
Inventory (Mor et al, 2013); and (3) the sum score of the Rumination Response Scale (RRS, 
Treynor et al., 2003) in the two different stimulation conditions (first two colums). In the third 
column (grey shaded), we present the t-value of the difference between both stimulation 
conditions. In the last three columns, we present the correlations coefficients for all the 
variables of our mediation/moderation model. Correlation above and below the diagonal are 
correlations in tDCS and sham, respectively. 
 
 tDCS 
Mean (SD) 
sham 
Mean (SD) 
t-value (1) (2) (3) 
RT angry -> neutral (1) 1035 (285) 1426 (444) 6.80** - .36* .27 
Self-referent Thinking (2) 26.4 (6.5) 27.1 (8.7) .47 .33 - .15 
Rumination: Total Score (3) 39.9 (11.2) 39.9 (11.2) - .55** .40* - 
Note. *p < .05. ** p <.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Summary table for the linear regression model with difference in momentary 
ruminative self-referent thinking (tDCS-sham) as outcome. 
 B s.e.(B) t p 
Intercept 2.038 2.094 0.973 .339 
Difference in IST 0.002 0.005 0.541 .593 
State self-referent thinking 0.6526 0.2540 2.570 .016 
State self-referent thinking * 
Difference in IST 
0.0012 0.0003 3.525 .002 
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Figure 1. An example the stimulus display of a trial during the emotion condition (left) and 
the non-emotion condition (right) of the Internal Shift task (IST) 
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Figure 2. An outline of the mediation/moderation model. The effect of tDCS on momentary 
ruminative self-referent thoughts is mediated by shifting away from angry to neutral 
representations in WM (as measured using the IST: angry -> neutral). Furthermore, trait 
rumination (measured using the Ruminative Response Scale) moderates this indirect effect .  
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Figure 3. A) Median reaction times (with SD) for all the shifting IST condition, both during 
tDCS and sham stimulation. We observed significant differences for reaction times angry -> 
neutral and neutral -> angry categories between tDCS and sham stimulation. B) Median 
reaction times (with SD) for all the non shifting IST conditions, both during tDCS and sham 
stimulation.  
Note:** <.001. 
38 
 
500 1000 1500 2000 2500
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
reaction time angry to neutral (in ms)
se
lf−
re
fe
re
n
t t
hi
nk
in
g
low trait rumination
high trait rumination
sham
tDCS
 
Figure 4. Scatterplot demonstrating the relation between RT angry to neutral (x-axis) 
momentary ruminative self-referent thinking (y-axis) with tDCS and sham stimulation 
(triangle and circle points, respectively). Lines connect observation points under tDCS and 
sham from the same participant and show whether participants scored low or high on trait 
rumination (solid and dashed lines, respectively). Note that there are 2 points without 
connecting line because of missing information on the trait rumination for that particular 
subject. 
 
